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1. Introduction
In a seminal paper, Choo and Siow (2006) introduced an empirically tractable
methodology to study two-sided matching models with perfectly transferable utility
and heterogeneity in tastes, also known as TU matching models. The key feature of
this methodology is that it recasts TU models as a set of two-sided discrete choice
problems. This allows the analyst to apply tools from discrete choice random utility
models to estimate preferences using a single cross-section of data. Following this
breakthrough, a fast growing literature has estimated marital preferences using a
wide range of attributes such as education, BMI, personality traits etc., see e.g. Choo
and Siow (2006), Dupuy and Galichon (2014), Chiappori, Salanie, and Weiss (2017),
Ciscato and Weber (2017), Ciscato, Galichon, and Gousse´ (2015), Dupuy (2018).
The marital preferences estimated by this method are, by construction, consistent
with the marital patterns observed in the data: the estimated marital surplus is larger
for types of couples that are more prevalent in the data once demographics have been
accounted for. Realized marital choices of individuals are taken as input and the
marital surplus which rationalizes these choices is inferred. Yet, little is known about
whether these estimates of marital preferences provide valuable information about
spouses’ well-being or marital stability.
The aim of this paper is to provide a first assessment of the empirical content of
marital preferences as estimated using TU matching models. Our approach consists
of comparing marital surplus estimates with measures of subjective well-being and
separation. To this aim, we first use the 2005 wave of the German SOcio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) and a parametric version of the Choo and Siow (2006) model to
estimate couples’ marital surplus. Second, we investigate the extent to which the
estimated marital surplus is associated with measures of subjective satisfaction and,
using later waves of data, the probability of separation.
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2. The Choo and Siow Model
Consider a two-sided one-to-one matching model with transferable utility. Men
and women, who aim at forming a heterosexual pair, are heterogenous and we denote
xi ∈ X (yj ∈ Y) the observed type of a (wo)man i (j). Individuals have the option
to remain single which is accounted for by including 0 in individuals’ choice set, i.e.
(wo)men can choose a partner among set Y0 = Y∪{0} (X 0 = X∪{0}). There is a
mass nx (my) of (wo)men of type x (y). We assume a large market so that there is a
large mass of agents of each type in the market.
A couple formed of a man i of type x and a woman j of type y derives a joint
surplus1
Φxy + εiy + ηxj,
where εiy (ηxj) is the idiosyncratic preference of (wo)man i (j) for a (wo)man of type y
(x), assumed to be i.i.d. distributed across individuals and following a (0, 1)−Gumbel
type I distribution.2 Utility being transferable, the joint surplus Φxy is shared among
spouses, the husband getting Uxy, the wife Vxy = Φxy − Uxy.
Men and women maximize their utility. A (wo)man i (j) of type x (y) hence solves
(2.1) ui = max
y∈Y0
(Uxy + εiy, εi0) , respectively vj = max
x∈X 0
(
Vxy + ηxj, η0j
)
,
where ui (vj) are the payoffs of (wo)man i (j).
Given U (V ), the optimal solutions to programs 2.1 generate conditional distri-
butions of (wo)men of type x (y) marrying type y (x) (wo)men, say µy|x and µx|y
respectively. It follows that:
1Without loss of generality, the systematic utility of remaining single for agents of each type is
normalized to 0, which allows us to use the term surplus rather than utility for married agents.
2Galichon and Salanie (2017) have shown that the methodology can be extended to more general
distributional assumptions.
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Definition 1. An equilibrium outcome consists of a feasible matching µ ∈M (n,m)
and payoffs (u, v) such that solutions to utility maximization (program 2.1) generate
µy|x × nx = µxy = µx|y ×my,
where µxy ≥ 0 is the mass of couples of type (x, y) and
M (n,m) =
µ|∑
y∈Y0
µxy = nx ∀x ∈ X ,
∑
x∈X 0
µxy = my ∀y ∈ Y

is the set of feasible matchings.
A well-known result by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik
(1971) states that there exists an equilibrium outcome, which is i) unique in large
markets (Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame, 1992; Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame, 1999), ii)
Pareto optimal and iii) pairwise stable.
Denoting Gx (Ux.) the expected indirect utility of a man of type x, one has
Gx(Ux.) := E
[
max
y∈Y
(Uxy + εiy, ε0)
]
= log(1 +
∑
y∈Y
exp(Uxy)),
with a similar expression for women. It follows that an application of the Daly-
Zachary-Williams theorem yields a logit structure so that one uncovers expressions
of U and V in terms of the matching as
(2.2) Uxy = log
µxy
µx0
, Vxy = log
µxy
µ0y
,
and hence an expression of the joint surplus Φ in terms of the matching as
(2.3) Φxy = 2 log
µxy√
µx0µ0y
.
Interestingly, equation 2.3 can easily be inverted to yield an expression for the
equilibrium mass of couples of type (x, y) given the equilibrium mass of singles of
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type x and y respectively and the joint surplus generated by couples (x, y) as
(2.4) µxy =
√
µx0µ0y exp
(
Φxy
2
)
.
Plugging this expression into the feasibility constraints in Definition 1 and using a
simple iterative algorithm (IPFP, see Galichon, Kominers and Weber, 2015), one can
compute the unique equilibrium matching µ given (Φxy)x,y.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data. We use the GSOEP data which provides detailed information on a rich
set of individual and household characteristics. For our analysis, the base year is set
at 2005, In this wave, a rich set of individual characteristics including, for the first
time, personality traits, are available. We keep all men (women) who are aged no less
than 25 (23) and no more than 49 (47) in 2005.3 These individuals are then matched
to their post-2005 marriage spells and subjective well-being.
The vectors of attributes X and Y which couples are expected to match along
include the following 11 variables: age, height, BMI, self-assessed health status, years
of education, willingness to take risks and the big 5 measures of personality.4
The same individuals are asked questions about their well-being. For each couple
in the 2005 wave, we therefore have, among others, each spouse’s subjective satisfac-
tion with life, satisfaction with the household’s income, whether they have children,
who according to each spouse has the last word in household’s financial decisions,
each spouse’s degree of pessimism about the future and whether each spouse attends
3The age selection is standard in this literature and changes in the selection did not alter the
main conclusion of our analysis.
4See the online appendix A for more details about the construction of these variables as well as
for some descriptive statistics.
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church. Moreover, using later waves, one can track 2005 spouses’ marital spells and
hence know whether these couples got separated between 2005 and 2016.5
3.2. Empirical methodology. The 2005 wave of the panel provides us with a rep-
resentative sample of Nˆ households. Each household h can consist of either a couple,
for which we observe the pair of vectors of attributes (Xh, Yh) or a single (wo)man,
for which we observe the vector Xh (resp. Yh), where Xh and Yh are of size K + 1,
with the convention that the last element is a constant.
We assume the surplus function is linear in parameters and reads as the sum of
three terms:
(3.1) Φλxy =
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
λkl
∣∣x(k) − y(l)∣∣+ ∑
z=x,y
3∑
p=1
K∑
k=1
λpk,z
(
z(k)
)p
+ λ0,
where λ = {(λkl)kl ,
(
λpk,x
)
k,p
,
(
λpk,y
)
k,p
, λ0} is the vector of parameters to be esti-
mated. The last term is a constant, the second indicates the main contribution of the
attributes of both the husband and the wife and takes the form of a polynomial of
order 3, while the first term indicates the contribution of the interaction between hus-
band’s and wife’s attributes.6 All attributes are standardized to facilitate comparison
between coefficients without loss of generality.
Following Galichon and Salanie (2017), we use a matching moment estimator which
consists in finding parameter λ such that the observed co-moments are equal to the
5Note that questions about well-being are asked in each wave between 2005 and 2016. Our results
are broadly consistent with whichever wave we use to construct measures of well-being and horizon
of separation.
6Increasing the order of the polynomial improves the fit of the model but since some coefficients
λ3k and λ
3
l are significantly different from 0 we set it to 3. The absolute difference specification is
shown to provide a better fit than a bilinear specification. See online appendix B.
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predicted ones, that is, for instance for the term
∣∣x(k) − y(l)∣∣,
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
µˆxy
∣∣x(k) − y(l)∣∣−∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
µλxy
∣∣x(k) − y(l)∣∣ = 0,
where the observed matching µˆ is computed from the data and the equilibrium match-
ing given parameter λ, µλ, is computed using Galichon, Kominers and Weber (2015)’s
IPFP Algorithm.
We then use the estimated parameters λ and the resulting equilibrium matching
µλ in equations 2.3 and 2.2 to compute, for each couple h observed in wave 2005,
the marital surplus Φλxhyh as well as a measure of the sharing of the surplus between
spouses, defined as
∣∣Uλxhyh − V λxhyh∣∣. The larger this term, the more unequally the
surplus is shared between spouses.
3.3. Results. Our estimates of preference parameters show standard features. The
interactions between spouses’ characteristics (λkl)kl are negative for all k = l, suggest-
ing that like attracts like on age, education, subjective health, attitude towards risk,
height, BMI and the big 5 personality traits. The magnitude of these interactions is
larger for age and education. Lastly, for each k and l 6= k, λkk > λkl.7
We now evaluate the extent to which the marital surplus Φλxhyh and how it is shared∣∣Uλxhyh − V λxhyh∣∣ correlate with measures of well-being and separation. Table 1 presents
these correlations for a selected number of variables. Results show that a higher mar-
ital surplus is significantly associated with a lower probability of becoming separated
by 2016, a higher probability of having children and a more equal subjective life sat-
isfaction between the two spouses. However, we also find that the marital surplus
is not correlated with own life satisfaction or household’s total life satisfaction al-
though it does correlate significantly and positively with women’s satisfaction with
household income. Regarding our measure of how the surplus is shared, we find that
7See table 4 in the online appendix.
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unequal sharing is not significantly associated with separation. However, it is neg-
atively and significantly associated with households’ total subjective life satisfaction
and positively and significantly associated with the spouses’ gap in subjective life
satisfaction. Moreover, the more unequally the estimated marital surplus is shared
among spouses, the lower the individual spouse’s subjective life satisfaction (with
life and with household’s income), and for men, the higher their degree of pessimism
towards the future.
Finally, interestingly enough, our results show that a higher marital surplus is also
associated with a higher probability that spouses agree on the fact that the husband
has the last word in the household’s financial decisions and a higher probability that
each spouse attends church. The more unequally the estimated marital surplus is
shared among spouses, the lower spouse’s church attendance. We interpret these
results as an indication that couples with higher marital surplus tend to be more
traditional in their gender roles and that couples with higher and more equally shared
marital surplus have a stronger attachment to the “institution of marriage” which, in
Germany, is mainly church-based. Further research could investigate the mechanisms
behind these associations.
4. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide a first assessment of the empirical content
of marital preferences, estimated using Choo and Siow (2006)’s methodology. Our
results show that the estimated marital surplus and its (unequal) sharing among
spouses is significantly associated with many variables of subjective well-being and
with marial dissolution, with the intuitively expected signs. We take our results as
providing further empirical validation of the Choo and Siow methodology and its
extensions recently proposed in the literature. Finally, this note suggests that more
insights could be gained by extending the present static framework to the dynamic
case, although this is left for future research.
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Table 1. Correlations
Marital surplus
(Φλxhyh)
Sharing of
surplus
(
∣∣Uλxhyh − V λxhyh∣∣)
A. Couples.
Separation -0.096*** -0.011
|Uλxhyh − V λxhyh | 0.010 1.000
Children in HH 0.099*** -0.015
Gross HH income (log) 0.010 -0.019
Last word: man 0.039** -0.018
Last word: wom -0.007 0.019
Last word: both 0.004 -0.005
Last word: disagree -0.029 0.007
Total life satisfaction 0.005 -0.067***
|Life satisfaction diff.| -0.064*** 0.041**
B. Married men.
Sat. with life (men) -0.007 -0.078***
Sat. with HH inc. (men) -0.006 -0.058***
Pessimistic (men) 0.016 0.064***
Church attendance (men) 0.076*** -0.042**
C. Married women.
Sat. with life (wom) 0.025 -0.035*
Sat. with HH inc. (wom) 0.039** -0.037*
Pessimistic (wom) 0.010 0.028
Church attendance (wom) 0.046** -0.033*
Note: *** means sig at 1%, ** sig at 5% and * sig at 10%. This table presents correlations between
our measure of marital surplus Φλxhyh and selected variables. Variables at the household level include:
a dummy indicating separation by 2016; the estimated utility gap (or sharing of marital surplus)∣∣Uλxhyh − V λxhyh ∣∣; a dummy indicating whether there are children in the household; the log of gross
household income; a set of four dummies indicating whether the final word regarding financial decisions
goes to the man, the woman, both or if they disagree on who has the last word; the sum of the partners’
subjective life satisfaction and the absolute value of the difference in subjective life satisfaction. At
the individual level (men and women), we use the following variables: subjective satisfaction with life;
subjective satisfaction with household income; a subjective measure of pessimistic attitude towards
the future; and a dummy indicating whether the individual goes to church.
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Online Appendix to “The empirical content of
marital surplus in matching models ”
by Karina Doorley, Arnaud Dupuy and Simon Weber
Appendix A provides a more complete description of the data used to estimate
marital surplus as well as descriptive statistics. Appendix B discusses the various
parametric specifications of the surplus that were tested and appendix C provides
parameter estimates for our preferred specification.
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Appendix A. Data
We use micro-data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) which
is a long-ranging panel data (1984–2016) providing detailed information on a rich set
of individual and household characteristics. The SOEP includes a separate marital
spell module which provides details on the start and end dates of each marriage spell.
The base year t0 is set at 2005 and corresponds to the first year that personality traits
are recorded in the SOEP. We keep all individuals who are aged no less than 25 and
no more than 49 in 2005. These individuals are then matched to their marriage spell
history.
Self-assessed height in centimeters and body weight in kilograms are recorded in
2004 and BMI is constructed from this information. Self-assessed health status is
recorded every year on a scale of 1 (“very good”) to 5 (“bad”) and the value of this
variable in 2005 (or, if this is missing, the closest previous assessment) is retained for
the analysis. Education level is available in years. The individual’s general willingness
to take risks is recorded in 2004 on a scale of 0 (“not at all willing to take risks”) to
10 (“very willing to take risks”). Life satisfaction (“How satisfied are you with your
life, all things considered”) is recorded every year as a categorical variable that takes
the values 0-10 (where 0 is “totally unsatisfied” and 10 is “totally satisfied”).
We also have information about personality traits. In 2005 (and 2009), the SOEP
included a condensed assessment of established psychological personality inventories
to measure the “Big five” personality factors: openness, conscientiousness, extraver-
sion, agreeableness and neuroticism. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement
with fifteen different statements about themselves, three for each personality trait,
on 7-point Likert scales (1: does not apply to me at all, 7: applies to me perfectly).
Following Caliendo, Ku¨nn, and Weißenberger (2016), we obtain a respondent’s score
for a particular personality characteristic by averaging the scores of each statement
relating to that characteristic, after adjusting for reverse coding where necessary.
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Donnellan and Lucas (2008) demonstrated that each of the scales in the SOEP corre-
lates highly with the corresponding scale in the full Big Five Inventory while Boyce,
Wood, and Ferguson (2016) found that the retest reliability in the German SOEP
between 2005 and 2009 was satisfactory, indicating little systematic change to the
scores over time.
Descriptive statistics for our sample for the year 2005 are displayed in table 2.8
Statistics are displayed separately for married and single individuals. Panel A, which
summarizes the data for women, indicates that there are 2,601 married women and
731 single women in the sample. The average age of women in the sample is 37 and
the average years of education is 12.5. There is little difference between the age or
education of married and single women. Among married women, 70% have children
in the household while the corresponding figure for single women is 41%. Gross
household income is higher for married women than for single women. Height is
similar across marital status at around 167 cm while average BMI is 24.1 for married
women and 23.4 for single women. Self assessed health is similar for married and
single women at 2.1 for married women and 2.2 for single women on a scale of 1-5. For
married women, life satisfaction is higher (7.1), satisfaction with household income is
higher (6.3) and willingness to take risks is lower (4.2) than for single women (6.6, 5.1,
and 4.7 respectively). When asked their attitude towards the future, married women
and single women are equally optimistic/pessimistic at around 2.1 on a scale of 1
(optimistic) to 4 (pessimistic). Married women are more likely (0.5) to attend church
than single women (0.3). Lastly, average values for the Big Five are very similar for
married and single women. On the 7-point Likert scale, average openness is around
4.6, conscientiousness is 6, extraversion is 5, agreeableness is 5.6 and neuroticism is
4.2.
8Figures for height, BMI and willingness to take risks relate to the year 2004 (the closest available
year).
4 KARINA DOORLEY‡, ARNAUD DUPUY§, SIMON WEBER†
Panel B depicts the same statistics for married men and single men. The number
of married men in the sample is 2,601, identical to the number of married women,
There are also 642 single men in the sample. Married men are older, on average, than
single men (39 and 37 respectively). Years of education are similar for each group
and similar to the average of 12.5 for women. 70% of married men have children in
their household compared to just 3% of single men. Gross household income is larger
for married men than single men. Average male height is 179 cm and there is little
difference between married and single men. Married men have a higher BMI (26.2)
than single men (24.9) although their self-assessed health is very similar (and similar
to that of women) at around 2 on a scale of 1-5. Like women, married men have higher
life satisfaction (7) and satisfaction with household income (6.2) than single men (6.6
and 5.5). While mens’ willingness to take risks is higher than that of women, the
pattern is similar with married men being less willing to take risks (5.2) than single
men (5.4). When asked their attitude towards the future, married men and single
men are equally optimistic/pessimistic at around 2.1 on a scale of 1 (optimistic) to
4 (pessimistic). Married men are more likely (0.5) to attend church than single men
(0.3). Average values for the Big Five are very similar for married and single men
and are comparable to the results for women. On the 7-point Likert scale, average
openness is around 4.4, conscientiousness is 5.9, extraversion is 4.8, agreeableness is
5.3 and neuroticism is 3.6.
Panel C shows couple level variables. The sum of life satisfaction of both spouses is
14 while the absolute difference between the life satisfaciton of spouses is 1.2. When
asked who has the last word on financial decisions in the household, most couples are
in agreement that both spouses share this equally (82%). A small minority state that
the woman (3%) or the man (5%) has the last word while 10% of couples disagree
on who has the last word. Finally, 15% of couples separate at some point during the
sample period.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Married Single Total
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
A. Women
Age 36.95 6.2 2601 35.44 7.3 731 36.62 6.5 3332
Height 166.76 6.3 2601 167.45 6.5 731 166.91 6.3 3332
BMI 24.09 4.1 2601 23.44 4.3 731 23.95 4.2 3332
Health 2.08 0.8 2601 2.19 0.9 731 2.11 0.8 3332
Educ. 12.46 2.6 2601 12.53 2.5 731 12.47 2.6 3332
Risk-taking 4.15 2.1 2601 4.71 2.2 731 4.28 2.2 3332
Openness 4.59 1.2 2601 4.81 1.2 731 4.64 1.2 3332
Conscientious 6.03 0.8 2601 5.97 0.8 731 6.01 0.8 3332
Extraversion 5.02 1.1 2601 5.11 1.1 731 5.04 1.1 3332
Agreeable 5.56 0.9 2601 5.55 0.9 731 5.56 0.9 3332
Neurotic 4.17 1.2 2601 4.11 1.3 731 4.16 1.2 3332
Gross HH income (log) 10.85 0.8 2579 9.53 1.5 699 10.57 1.1 3278
Children in HH 0.70 0.5 2601 0.41 0.5 731 0.64 0.5 3332
Sat. with life (wom) 7.11 1.7 2595 6.60 2.0 730 7.00 1.8 3325
Sat. with HH inc. (wom) 6.31 2.2 2583 5.13 2.5 724 6.06 2.4 3307
Pessimistic (wom) 2.04 0.7 2591 2.09 0.8 729 2.05 0.8 3320
Church attendance (wom) 0.52 0.5 2589 0.33 0.5 729 0.48 0.5 3318
B. Men
Age 39.19 6.0 2601 36.63 7.0 642 38.68 6.3 3243
Height 179.52 7.0 2601 179.40 7.0 642 179.49 7.0 3243
BMI 26.22 3.5 2601 24.92 3.6 642 25.96 3.6 3243
Health 2.03 0.8 2601 2.06 0.8 642 2.04 0.8 3243
Educ. 12.58 2.8 2601 12.73 2.6 642 12.61 2.7 3243
Risk-taking 5.23 2.1 2601 5.44 2.1 642 5.27 2.1 3243
Openness 4.38 1.1 2601 4.60 1.1 642 4.42 1.1 3243
Conscientious 5.95 0.9 2601 5.85 0.9 642 5.93 0.9 3243
Extraversion 4.77 1.1 2601 4.85 1.1 642 4.79 1.1 3243
Agreeable 5.26 1.0 2601 5.35 0.9 642 5.28 1.0 3243
Neurotic 3.64 1.2 2601 3.66 1.2 642 3.64 1.2 3243
Gross HH income (log) 10.85 0.8 2579 9.97 1.5 614 10.68 1.0 3193
Children in HH 0.70 0.5 2601 0.03 0.2 642 0.57 0.5 3243
Sat. with life (men) 7.00 1.8 2595 6.56 1.9 642 6.91 1.8 3237
Sat. with HH inc. (men) 6.19 2.2 2585 5.45 2.4 634 6.04 2.3 3219
Pessimistic (men) 2.08 0.8 2591 2.12 0.8 641 2.09 0.8 3232
Church attendance (men) 0.46 0.5 2593 0.29 0.5 640 0.42 0.5 3233
C. Couple variables
Separation 0.15 0.4 2601 . . 0 0.15 0.4 2601
Last word: man 0.05 0.2 2572 . . 0 0.05 0.2 2572
Last word: wom 0.03 0.2 2572 . . 0 0.03 0.2 2572
Last word: both 0.82 0.4 2572 . . 0 0.82 0.4 2572
Last word: disagree 0.10 0.3 2572 . . 0 0.10 0.3 2572
Total life satisfaction 14.07 3.0 2601 . . 0 14.07 3.0 2601
|Life satisfaction diff.| 1.17 1.3 2589 . . 0 1.17 1.3 2589
Descriptive statistics for married and single women and men in GSOEP wave 2005 (2004 values of height, weight,
BMI and risk-taking)
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Table 3. Specifications and selection criteria (log-likelihood values)
Spec # Spec. φkl Spec. φ
p
k, φ
p
l φkl(·, ·) φpk(·), φpl (·) log(L)
1 1 1 x× y x, y -5.4855
2 1 2 x× y x, x2, y, y2 -5.4031
3 1 3 x× y x, x2, x3, y, y2, y3 -5.4009
4 2 1 |x− y| x, y -5.3952
5 2 2 |x− y| x, x2, y, y2 -5.3877
6 2 3 |x− y| x, x2, x3, y, y2, y3 -5.3841
The value of the log-likelihood is normalized to −1 for specification 1.
Appendix B. Parametric specifications
Recall that the surplus is parameterized as in equation 3.1. This requires us to
specify the underlying basis functions. We propose to choose among a total of 6
specifications the one that best fits the data. These 6 specifications are obtained by
considering two specifications for basis functions capturing the interaction between
spouses’ characteristics, φkl, and three specifications for the basis functions capturing
the main effects of husbands’ characteristics, φpk and wives’ characteristics φ
p
l .
The first specification for the basis functions φkl assumes that the interaction
between men’s and women’s characteristics is the product of these characteristics,
namely
φkl(x
(k), y(l)) = x(k)y(l) ∀k, l ∈ K × L
in which case, characteristics are complement whenever λkl > 0 or substitutes when-
ever λkl < 0.
The second specification assumes that the interaction between men’s and women’s
characteristics is the absolute value of the difference of these characteristics, that is
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φkl(x
(k), y(l)) = |x(k) − y(l)| ∀k, l ∈ K × L
in which case λkl indicates the importance of “similarities” between the k-th attribute
of husbands and the l-th attribute of wives. If λkl is positive (negative), spouses with
(dis-)similar attributes attract (repel) each other.
The basis functions φpk and φ
p
l , for p ∈ {1, ..., P}, are assumed to be linear combina-
tions of men’s and women’s characteristics. We propose to use power transformations
of these characteristics,
φpk(x
(k)) = (x(k))p and φpl (y
(l)) = (y(l))p
for all k ∈ {1, ..., K} and l ∈ {1, ..., L}, and consider three specifications, P = 1,
P = 2 and P = 3.
Table 3 provides a summary of these specifications. We are agnostic about which
model is best to bring to the data. We make use of the marriage patterns predicted
by each specification to compute a likelihood which is reported in the last column
of Table 3. Obviously, increasing P improves the fit of the model but since some
coefficients λ3k and λ
3
l are significantly different from 0 we set P = 3. The most drastic
improvement in the fit of the model however is obtained by choosing the absolute value
of the difference in characteristics rather than the product to describe the interaction
between men’s and women’s traits. Therefore, our preferred specification for the
remainder of the paper will be specification 6.
Appendix C. Estimates
The estimates of preference parameters capturing the interaction between spouses’
characteristics (λkl)kl are reported in table 4. Three familiar patterns appear at first
glance. First, all the diagonal entries of the matrix are negative, suggesting that like
attracts like. Second, consistent with previous studies, the coefficients of age (−4.23)
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Table 4. Estimate of the affinity matrix
Age Height BMI Health Educ. Risk Open. Consc. Extrav. Agree. Neuro.
Age -4.23 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.10 -0.02 -0.06 0.12
Height -0.17 -0.68 0.08 -0.06 -0.27 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.19 0.03 -0.01
BMI -0.03 -0.17 -0.62 -0.16 0.02 -0.15 0.23 -0.14 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05
Health 0.11 0.01 -0.06 -0.56 -0.16 -0.28 0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.04
Educ. -0.23 -0.15 0.38 0.07 -1.71 -0.16 -0.04 0.01 0.21 0.18 0.12
Risk -0.09 -0.04 0.24 0.16 -0.08 -0.80 0.03 0.09 0.13 -0.02 -0.21
Open. -0.15 0.07 0.10 -0.03 -0.14 -0.09 -0.79 -0.03 0.22 -0.00 -0.14
Consc. -0.09 -0.01 -0.00 0.13 0.32 0.05 -0.10 -0.63 -0.06 -0.13 0.18
Extrav. 0.02 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 -0.00 0.09 0.16 -0.17 -0.28 -0.11 0.03
Agree. 0.12 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.48 -0.14
Neuro. 0.12 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.18 -0.01 -0.12 0.14 -0.07 -0.32
Estimates for the interaction between X and Y , for specification 2 of φkl(·, ·) and specification 3 for (φpk(·), φpl (·))
and education (−1.71) stand out: with the coefficient of age being 2.5 times larger
than that of education, which itself is twice as large as the third largest coefficient
(−0.8 for the interaction of risk attitude). Third, for all eleven characteristics, the
coefficient on the diagonal dominates off-diagonal entries (in magnitude).9
9All variables are normalized, therefore the entries in the matrix are comparable with each other.
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